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INTRODUCTION
One hundred and forty-two nations met on November 14, 2001 for
the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization
("WTO").' After marathon sessions of negotiations and hard
1. See World Trade Organization, Negotiations, Implementation and
Development: the Doha Agenda, at 1 [hereinafter Doha Agenda] (noting the fourth
meeting of the WTO, which took place in November 2001, addressed
approximately
one
hundred
implementation
issues),
at
http://vww.wto.org/english/tratop- e/ddae/dda_e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2002);
see generally Helene Cooper & Geoff Winestock, Tough Talkers: Poor Nations
Win Gains in Global Trade Deal, as U.S. Compromises, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15,
2001, at Al, A12 (stating that there are one hundred forty-two nations in the
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bargaining, the members agreed to launch new negotiations on
international trade called the "Doha Development Agenda ("DDA").This initiative seeks to change the complexion and orientation of the

global trade architecture

by making it more supportive

of

development.'

WTO), available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29677980.
2. See World Trade Organization, Fourth Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration]
(memorializing the agreement made between the 142 nations that attended the
talks
at
Doha),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
ministe/01_e/mindecl_e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2002); see also Ravi Kanthin,
Deal Reached For New WTO Round, BUS. TIMES (SING.), Nov. 15, 2001 (stating

that after six days of battling the members agreed to the Doha Development
Agenda, which is designed to generate new talks regarding trade in farm and
industrial products), available at 2001 WL 29573414. The Doha Ministerial
Conference chose not to use the term "round" in its Declaration. This was
presumably done because some developing countries were very much against the
concept of a "Multilateral Round of Negotiations." See Tony Smith, Poor
Countries See Chance After Doha, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 15, 2001 (detailing
how throughout the world, developing nations felt cheated by the last round of
world trade talks and complained that the rules were made for and by rich,
industrialized nations), available at 2001 WL 30245312. A more positive
explanation is that the term "Development Agenda," however, was meant to
highlight the qualitatively different orientation of these negotiations. Id. Some have
noted that the final Declaration is riddled with language intended to help
developing nations. Id. Furthermore, some delegates also believe it is reasonable to
expect that all the euphemisms contained in the language of the Declaration will be
quietly forgotten over the coming months and that most participants will be content
to admit to a significant round, even if its scope is nothing close to that of the
Uruguay Round. See Guy de Jonquieres, All Night Haggling in Doha Ends in
Agreement, WTO Meeting New Mood of Cooperation, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001,
at 11 (commenting that the conference ultimately achieved its result by satisfying
everyone enough to produce an acceptable agreement and concluding that the
conference really sought to foster future talks on global trade liberalization and
define the parameters and goals of these talks), availableat 2001 WL 31140125.
3. See World Trade Organization, The IWTO Hosts Public Symposium: The
Doha Development Agenda and Beyond, at I (referring to the statements of WTO
Director General, Mike Moore, who spoke about the Doha Declaration's emphasis
one the major role of international trade in the promotion of economic
development
and
the
alleviation
of
poverty),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/sympdevagenda_02-e.htm
(last
visited Mar. 23, 2002).
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A. REACTIONS TO THE DOHA AGREEMENT
1. Positive Perception
A large number of participants warmly greeted the DDA.' Mike
Moore, Director General of the WTO, highlighted its significance in
somewhat hyperbolic terms:
By any standards, the 4th Ministerial Conference of the WTO was an
extraordinarily successful meeting. We tend to talk rather glibly about the
historic importance of such events, but this time, for once, the claim is not
exaggerated; the meeting at Doha will be remembered as a turning-point
in the history of the WTO and the trading system and in5 relations between
developed and developing countries within that system.
In a similar vein, Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Trade Representative
and head of the U.S. delegation declared, "Members of the WTO
have sent a powerful signal to the world. We have removed the stain
of Seattle." 6 The Financial Times was somewhat less ebullient, but
still acknowledged the significance of the accord:
The agreement in Doha, to launch a new round of trade talks pulls the
multilateral trading system back from the brink. The accord signals
only the start of intense negotiations that could take several years. But a
failure to begin would have undermined confidence in the World Trade

4. See David Williams, World Trade Ministers Throw off Seattle Curse,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 15, 2001 (stating that the participants at the Doha
conference erased the stigma of the Seattle meeting and explaining that this
meeting came at a crucial time of fragile global nerves), available at 2001 WL
25063419.
5. Director-General Mike Moore, Speech at the Fourteenth General Meeting
of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Moore
Speech] (claiming that the Doha conference was an extraordinarily successful
meeting and concluding that the meeting at Doha was a turning point for trade
negotiation),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spmm-e/
spmm73_e.htm (last visited Mar. 23,2002).
6. Paul Geitner, WTO Will Begin a New Round of Talks, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 15, 2001, at 2, available at 2001 WL-WSJA 29657108; see also Guy de
Jonquieres, WTO Reaches Agreement to Launch New Trade Talks, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2001, at 1 (echoing the positive sentiments that the round of talks helped
put the WTO back on track after Seattle).

2002]

RECAPTURING MOMENTUM

1101

Organization and more 7generally in global economic co-operation, just
when it is indispensable.

2. A Different Perceptionby Some

The representatives of many developing countries were, however,
not as jubilant.8 Some, such as Pakistan's WTO Ambassador, Munir
Akram, were plainly disappointed.9 He stated that, "We don't like it
but it's a question of whether we will have to swallow it."'" Swallow,
is exactly what they had to do, when, after a protracted battle, the
Indian Commerce Minister ultimately chose to give up on his attempt
to block the agreement.II

B. GLIMMER OR CHIMERA?

It would be instructive to examine whether the Doha Agreement
really deserves the fulsome praise showered upon it, or whether it is
a colossal disappointment. 2 Does the outcome at Doha really signify
a recaptured momentum towards multilateralism in global trade or is

7. Editorial, A Deal in Doha, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 16.
8. See Cooper & Winestock, supra note 1, at A l (noting that Pakistani envoys
said that they were disappointed because they had counted on the WTO talks to
boost economic development through trade, not aid).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. See Editorial, supra note 7 (noting that while nations such as France were
hold outs at Doha, "the worst villain was India, which attempted to block the
progress of the talks at every turn"). Furthermore, even the developing countries
got exasperated with India's WTO representative. The Kenyan Minister accused
him of throwing the landmark deal on patents into jeopardy. See id. (explaining
that Indian Commerce Minister Maran was unchasened as he declared after the
agreement was concluded, "I intimidated them."); see also Cooper & Winestock,
supra note 1, at Al (explaining that India demanded concessions from the United
States and Europe for five days before ultimately giving support to the text of the
declaration).
12. See Mary Fagan, Trade IWar With the Ink Barely Dry on Doha Agreement
to Liberalize World Markets, SUNDAY TEL., Mar. 10, 2002 at P7 (noting that
certain events that have transpired since the conclusion of the Doha conference
have upset some of its participants, such as the European trade commissioner,
Pascal Lamy), availableat 2002 WL 7770861.

1102

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[17:1097

it just business as usual in an asymmetrical world? Do we really see
a glimmer of hope or just a chimera?

I. CONCEPT OF MULTILATERISM IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
A. DEFINITION OF MULTILATERALISM

This paper attempts to address the question of whether the Doha
Accord has rescued the multilateral trading system from the edge of
a precipice. Multilateralism, in the context of global trade, isdefined
as "an approach to the conduct of international trade based on
cooperation, equal rights and obligations, non-discrimination and
participation as equals of many countries regardless of their size or
share of international trade."13
Multilateralism is not just a matter of form. 4 The essence of this
concept lies in an approach anchored in a philosophy of cooperation,
equity, and non-discrimination. 5 Multiculturalism seeks to foster a
sense of real and substantive symmetry, 6 which envisions
meaningful participation in the process by all actors, irrespective of
their size or weight in global trade. " Obviously, mere adherence to
13.

DICTIONARY OF TRADE POLICY TERMS 187 (2nd ed. 1998).

14. See Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability /br the
Use of the WTO Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and
Establishing a Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilaterialism, 26 YAL, J.
INT'L L. 413, 423 (2001) (explaining that the 1982 Ministerial Declaration
supported multilateralism but failed to establish any real obligations).
15. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Why Multilateralism Matters in Resolving TradeEnvironment Disputes, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 31, 68 (2001) (suggesting that since
multilateralism is rule-based, it will be helpful to developing countries because
such nations need rules-based regimes to help resolve disputes with developed
nations, in a predictable and consistent manner).
16. See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and
Multilateralism:A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J.
419, 421 (explaining that the global trading system requires a new paradigm that is
capable of overcoming deficiencies and outdated elements of earlier trade
agreements).
17. See Cann, supra note 14, at 418 (stating that GATT was designed to
improve international trade by creating arrangements that were reciprocal and
mutually advantageous to the nations involved but concluding that GATT's true
goal was to create additional global wealth).
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the formal component of multilateralism is not sufficient." Rather, it
is critical to respect and appreciate the spirit of this concept."9
B. IMPLICATIONS OF MULTILATERALISM
Multilateralism in the true sense of the word 2 would require that
the needs and concerns of developing countries, 2' which have come
to constitute the overwhelming majority of WTO membership, be
meaningfully addressed.2-' Trade negotiations should therefore be
guided by the principles of fairness and thoroughness. 23
In order to ascertain whether the principles of multilateralism have
benefited developing countries under the DDA, it is necessary to
examine: the relevant features of the existing global trade
architecture; the current position of developing countries in WTO
system; and the concerns and interests of developing countries. 2'

18. See id. (detailing how GATT sought to encourage free trade as a means to a
more comprehensive end-that of increasing wealth on a global scale).
19. See id. (concluding that GATT demonstrates the true spirit of
multilateralism by raising global standards of living and to ensuring that
developing nations share in the benefits).
20. See id. (defining the true elements of multilateralism as suggested by
GATT).
21. See John 0. McGinnis, World Trade Agreements Advancing the Interests of
the Poorest of the Poor, 34 IND. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2001) (arguing that
multilateralism is beneficial to poor and developing nations and acts as attractive
bait to leaders of despotic regimes).
22. See Cann, supra note 14, at 418 (suggesting that multilateralism requires
some substantive obligations by nations that are participants in trade agreements).
23. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principlesfor the Newt Round, or How to Bring
Developing Countries in fi'om the Cold, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
WTO: A PROACTIVE AGENDA 7, 11 (Bernard Hoekman & Will Martin, eds. 2001)
(stating that the principles of fairness and comprehensiveness are crucial to the
success of the next round of trade talks because they necessitate the inclusion of
issues that are important to developing nations).
24. See Cann, supra note 14, at 418 (recognizing special needs of developing
countries in the WTO Agreement and stating that the absence of standards
perpetuated by a minority of countries poses a threat to the security of the entire
international trade system).
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C. EXISTING MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM

In 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
established the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system that exists
today.2" Prior to the GATT, bilateral agreements between states
primarily resolved disputes involving international trade.26 The need
for establishing a rules-based, multilateral trading system was
acutely felt after the unfortunate experience of beggar-thy neighbor
policies and extreme protectionism during the inter-war years.27 The
GATT, however, was intended to be a provisional arrangement.28 Its
drafters ultimately intended to establish a third pillar of the Bretton
Woods system and to continue developing the new global
architecture. 29 That attempt failed, however, and the GATT filled up

25. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I I,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (making a provisional
agreement that laid the foundation for the Havana Charter); see also Paul Demaret,
The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charterto the World Trade
Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 126 (1995) (explaining that
GATT was a gap filler and that the Havana Charter was an agreement of much
broader scope that established the International Trade Organization and an
elaborate dispute settlement procedure and concluding that the Havana Charter
never entered into force because the United States failed to ratify it, and as a result,
the General Agreement, by force of circumstances, remained in force). Ultimately,
in pursuance of the Uruguay Round Final Act in 1994, GATT was subsumed into
the new international organization, the WTO. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 36-42 (1997) (remarking that in some ways the WTO, afler

many years, has become the missing "leg" of the Bretton Woods "stool").
26. See Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in I UNITED
NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 503, 515 (Oscar Schacter & Christopher C. Joyner eds.

1995) (discussing how, prior to GATT, bilateral trade agreements resolved
international trade issues between nations).
27. See Kennedy, supra note 15, at 68 (stating the problems such as currency
devaluation underscore the need for rule-based regimes for resolving disputes
between developed and developing nations).
28. See Demaret, supra note 25, at 126 (underscoring that GATT was intended
to be a temporary provision).
29. See World Trade Organization, Roots: From Havana to Marrakesh
[hereinafter Roots: From Havana to Marrakesh] (stating that the original intention
of GATT was to both create a institution to handle international economic
cooperation and join the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the
International
Monetary
Fund),
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Mar.
23, 2002).
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the vacuum.30 The progressive liberalization of tariffs," the most

favored nation trading status,32 and the national treatment principles
are now the fundamental principles of GATT. 3 There have been
eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under GATT that have
slashed industrial tariffs from an average of 40 percent to 3.8
percent.3 4 As a consequence, world trade has expanded fourteen-fold
since the GATT came into effect. 5
D. OTHER FEATURES OF THE SYSTEIM

Other features to the current world trading system include:
Selective liberalizationheductionof tariffs: The prevailing pattern
of protection is biased against poor countries because the barriers are
highest on goods produced by them-agriculture and unskilled labor
intensive products and labor intensive services.36
30. See id. (noting how GATT's basic legal text remained the way it was in
1948 for almost halfa century and in that sense filled in for Bretton Woods).
31. See World Trade Organization, What Is 11O? [hereinafter W1hat Is WTO?]
(listing the three main purposes of the WTO, the first of which addresses tariffs),
available at http://www.vto.org/english/thewto-e/tif_e/factll_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2002).
32. See JACKSON, supra note 25, at 36-42 (stating that a second but equally
important obligation of GATT is the Most Favored Nation obligation); see also
GATT, supra note 25, art. I (describing most favored nation trading status).
33. See GATT supra note 25, art. III (codifying the National Treatment on
Internal Taxation and Regulation and the manner in which imports are taxed to
protect domestic production).
34. See What Is WTO?, supra note 31 (stating that there have been several
rounds of WTO meetings and these meetings have resulted in a reduction of tariffs
to a low of less than four percent in industrialized nations).
35. See id. (offering the experience of world trade and economic growth since
World War II as evidence that there is an economic case for an open trading
system).
36. See Bernard Hoekman, Strengthening the Global Trade Architecture .'r
Development: The Post Doha Agenda, Nov. 16, 2001, at 2 (previewing how global
trade architecture may be made more supportive of development), available at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/vbiep/trade/strengthening.pdf (last visited Mar. 23,
2002). Agriculture and labor intensive products, constituting more than half the
exports of developing countries (and about seventy percent of that of the least
developed countries), face many barriers in the industrial countries. Id. at 6. These
barriers include steeply escalating, non-transparent tariffs, tariff peaks, and a
plethora of domestic and export subsidies. Id. Tariff rates on developing countries'
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Use of Trade for Non Trade Objectives: Interest groups are
increasingly seeking to use trade as a tool to enforce rules for nontrade objectives and policies.3 7
Relatively Ineffective Participation of Developing Countries in
WTO: This, to a great extent, stems from capacity constraints. As a
result, the WTO agenda items and multilateral rules, at times, do not
fully reflect their interests.38
High Cost of Negotiations: As negotiation and implementation of
agreements can be costly, there is a danger of resource diversion

exports are four times of those imposed on exports from industrial countries (3.4
percent as compared to 0.8 percent). Tariffs, in fact, for some commodities total
over one hundred percent. Id. at 5. Such peak rates (above fifteen percent) are
often concentrated in products that are exportable items to developing countries.
Id. In 1999, in the United States alone, imports originating in the least developed
countries ("LDCs") generated tariff revenue of $487 million, equal to 11.6 percent
of the value of their exports to the United States and 15.7 percent of dutiable
imports. See Hoekman, supra note 36, at 5. Support to their agriculture producers
alone in high-income countries is roughly one billion dollars a day or more, which
is more than six times of all the revenue flows to developing countries. Id. at 6.
Again, the situation with respect to manufacturing leaves much to be desired from
the point of view of developing countries. Despite the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing ("ATC"), gains have still failed to increase, substantially due to the back
loaded architecture of the ATC, envisaging the largest segment of liberalization at
the end of the transition period by January 1, 2005. Id. at 6. Furthermore,
reintegration of this sector by itself does not take care of the tariff barriers. Market
access will remain restricted unless tariff rates are lowered. In addition, there are
substantial barriers to market access in respect of services. Id. at 7. According to
one calculation, income gains that could accrue to developing countries' nationals
through allowing an increase in temporary access by service suppliers would be
equivalent to approximately $300 billion. Id. at 6. To put things in perspective,
however, it would be pertinent to note that the current degree of protection on
goods manufactured in developing countries (though lowered in the recent past)
constitutes a significant barrier. See generally Hoekman, supra note 36, at 5-8. For
instance, the tariff average in developing nations is four times higher as compared
to duty regime in the high-income countries (12.8 percent vs. 3.4 percent). Id. This
shows the possibility of welfare gains should developing countries seek further
reciprocal tariff liberalization. Id..
37. See, e.g., Greenpeace, Safe Trade in the Twenty-First Centurv: The Doha
Edition, Aug. 2001, at 8 (stating that the WTO operates in a manner inconsistent
with its own charter, which provides for "'the optimal use of the world's resources
in accordance with the objective of sustainable development'), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/search.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2002)
38. See, e.g., Cooper & Winestock, supra note I, at Al (noting the
disappointment and frustration of the Pakistani delegation to the Doha conference).
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away from development priorities.
Legalistic Bias: There is an excessive reliance on litigation to
enforce agreements.3 9

II. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO
SYSTEM
A. DOMINANT ROLE OF INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
When twenty-three nations, mainly comprised of wealthy nations,
agreed to become contracting parties to the GATT, the needs and
interests of developing nations did not appear to matter much."0
Industrialized nations, who were then rebuilding their economies,
focused upon integration among themselves.4 Europe, North
America, and Japan concentrated on restoring trade relations through
a series of multilateral trade liberalization agreements under the
auspices of the GATT.4 2 The majority of developing countries
continued to export primary commodities, which further diminished
their influence and voice in the world trading system. 3 As one
commentator notes, the developing countries were, and remained for
a long time, marginal entities in the system:
Instead of aggressively seeking market access in the industrialized world,
these countries defensively sought special and differential treatment on

commitments to open their markets, and they obtained marginal trade
preferences or concessions on a nonreciprocal basis. Not surprisingly,

39. See generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of
Dispute Resolution Regines in International Trade Organizations 20 Micil. J.

INT'L L. 697, 702 (1999) (underscoring the importance of alternate dispute
resolution regimes in international trade).
40. See Stiglitz, supra note 23, at 8-9 (noting that rich countries sometimes

play down the political pressures within developing countries).
41. See Roots: From Havana to Marrakesh, supra note 29 (explaining how in

the early years, GATT trade rounds focused on further reducing tariffs).
42. See id. (pointing out that the Tokyo round was the first significant attempt
to tackle trade barriers).
43. See id. (stating that GATT's basic legal text remained relatively unchanged
for almost half a century and that much of the achievement stemmed from the
multilateral negotiations between the major players, the twenty-three developed
nations).
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even while they were "free riding" by virtue of the GATT's most favored
nation (MFN) principle, they received new concessions of specific
interest to them. a

Thus, the initial multilateral trading regime excluded any
meaningful role for the developing world. a
B. URUGUAY ROUND: A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF
PARTICIPATION

Despite many defects from the developing countries' points of
view, the Uruguay Round signaled a change in the nature of the
4
participation of developing countries in the world trading system. 1
Trade scholars note:
For the first time, developing country participants chose to strike bargains
on the basis of reciprocity. By and large, they committed themselves to
lowered industrial and agricultural tariffs, accepted stringent disciplines in
new areas such as intellectual property, and opened up some of their
services sectors in return for improved and more secure market access for
their exports, particularly for agricultural products and clothing. The new
WTO subjected these commitments to a stricter and more effective
mechanism, one that developing countries have been
dispute settlement 47
increasingly using.

C. FORMAL PARTICIPATION PROCESS
Formal participation in the 1960 Dillon Round of multilateral
negotiations included only thirty-nine participants, mostly from

44. Jayashree Watal, Developing Countries' Interests in a Development Round,
in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 71 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (explaining that for
many decades, developing nations were not significant players in the rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations in GATT).
45. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (examining why the
developing world was initially excised from the world trading system).
46. See Watal, supra note 44, at 72 (explaining that low market access payoffs
and the heavy burden of implementing certain WTO agreements made developing
nations believe that they were not gaining much from the Uruguay Round).
47. Id. at 71 (arguing that Uruguay was a watershed in the participation of
developing nations in the trading system).
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developed countries.48 In contrast, Doha had one hundred forty-two
participants with more
than seventy percent of these being from the
developing world. 49 The huge presence of developing countries is
indicative of their increasing weight in the global economy and the
fact that these countries account for more than one-third of the
merchandise trade."' Their stake in the positive evolution of the
world trading system is increasing." These impressive aggregate
figures, however, conceal enormous differences among developing
countries, a large number of which actually trade less today than they
did twenty years ago. 2
D. COMMON FEATURES AMID DIVERSITY
In the context of the WTO, the priorities and interests of
developing countries assume marked variety and even divergence .
In some cases, certain developing countries have become part of
alliances that include developed countries, such as the Cairns Group

48. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES xi (2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS] (discussing the
background information of past negotiations, specifically the type and number of
participating
countries),
available
at
www.worldbank.org/prospects/
gep2002/sumend.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
49. See id. (highlighting the increase in participation by countries, especially
those considered developing nations).
50. See id. (explaining that the increased number of developing countries at the
negotiations is representative of their power in the global economy because their
portion of world trade has grown substantially).
51. See id. (arguing that developing nations have a larger interest in the newest
round of negotiations because they have increased their trading).
52. See WORLD BANK, GLOBALIZATION, GROwVTH AND POVERTY: BUILDING
AN EXCLUSIVE WORLD ECONOMY 4-5 (2002) (noting that the export share of the
least developed countries shrank from 3 percent in the 1950s to around 0.5 percent
in the early 1980s and has hovered at this very low rate over the last two decades);
see also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, DUTY AND
QUOTA FREE MARKET ACCESS FOR LDCs: AN ANALYSIS OF QUAD INITIATIVES
(2001) (discussing the decrease in the amount of goods exported by the developing
countries
internationally),
available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
poditctabm7en.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
53. See BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, THE WTO AGREEMENrrS: DEFICIENCIES,
IMBALANCES AND REQUIRED CHANGES xi (1998) (stating that some researchers
believe that the developing countries are so diverse that they should not be joined
together as a group for analysis or negotiating purposes).
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of agricultural exporters." Despite this increasing diversity and
divergence, some commentators note that developing countries still
share certain significant and common features:
A very large number of [developing nations] have intrinsic economic
weaknesses. They are also technologically weak. Resources devoted to
research and development in these countries are small and their share in
industrial innovations is negligible compared to those in developed
countries. Their infrastructure for manufacture and trade as well as
modem services is weak. They are short of resources for investment in
these areas. All these handicaps indicate bleak prospects not only for the
55
present but also in the near future.

E. THE STAKE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE
MULTILATERAL SYSTEM

Developing countries are fully aware of their high stake in the
evolving WTO multilateral trading system. 6 They understand the
need for a transparent and rules-based trading system and an
effective dispute settlement mechanism even more than the
developed countries.57 They also appreciate the rationale for open
trade and the necessity of expanding the multilateral trade agenda.58
These countries, however, have serious apprehensions about the
course that the multilateral system is taking. 9

54. See Cairns Group, An Introduction (explaining that the Group is a coalition
of eighteen agricultural exporters, consisting of developed and developing
countries), available at http://www.caimsgroup.org/ introduction.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2002). Members include: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada.
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. Id.
55. LAL DAS, supra note 53, at xi (recording the large number of features
common to developing nations).
56. See A.V. Ganesan, Seattle and Beyond: Developing-Country Perspectives,
in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 85 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (discussing the
developing countries view of the importance of their participation in the
negotiations).
57. See id. (explaining the type of trading system that the developing nations
would prefer and would benefit their countries the most).
58. See id. (arguing that the developing nations understand the reasoning
behind the agenda expansion).
59. See id. (noting that while the countries understand the new expansion being
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III. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' CONCERNS ON
THE EVE OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL
A. DISSATISFACTION AND RESERVATION
When developing countries arrived in Doha with memories of the
Seattle debacle still fresh in their minds, they had serious concerns
that the multilateral system:
[Was] leaving intact barriers to markets whose removal would otherwise
stimulate pro-poor growth, has become less fair and less relevant to their
development concerns; that the trade agenda is being expanded to include
only issues in which the developed countries have an interest; and that
multilateral rules are increasingly becoming a mere codification of
existing laws and rules prevalent in developed countries, but which are
inappropriate or unenforceable in developing countries.60

While the major trading partners (the United States, the European
Union, Japan, and Canada) sought to launch a "new round" of
multilateral negotiations, 6 some of the like-minded developing
countries did not share the same objective.62 They were disappointed
with the past rounds of trade negotiations and therefore opposed a
new round, in spite of the apparent beneficial potential of
comprehensive multilateral talks. 63 The primary concerns of the
developing countries about a new round of talks were:
made in trade, they are apprehensive that developed countries are influencing the
new negotiations too much).
60. Id. (detailing the concerns of the developing states regarding the evolution
of the multilateral system which favors developed nations); see also GLOBAL
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS supra note 48, at xi (describing the issues facing the
developing states through the multilateral system of trade).
61. LAL DAS, supra note 53, at 1 (stating that the developed nations of the
world supported a new round of negotiations).
62. See Like Minded Group Sets Out Positions Before Doha, 5 ICTD BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 26 (2001) [hereinafter Like Minded Group] (listing the
members of the like-minded groups as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Honduras, Indonesia, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zimbabwe, and Jamaica), available at http://www.ictsd.orgfhtmlweekly/l10-0701/story2.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
63. See id. (clarifying the like-minded group's position that even if progress is
made regarding the implementation issues, that does not guarantee that the group
will participate in the negotiations).
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(i) they would be the main targets for extracting concessions in any new
round;
(ii) new subjects of interest to developed countries in which the
developing countries themselves had no particular interest would be taken
up for negotiations; and
(iii) the subjects which had been of interest to them for a long time would
get ignored, as the focus of GATT would shift to the new issues initiated
in the round.64

Many other developing countries, however, still believed that a

round should be launched because, in their view, the problems could
be addressed only through comprehensive negotiations where
bargains could be made. 65 The World Bank advocated launching a

"Development

Round"

to

advance

development

objectives,

particularly poverty reduction.6 6
B. PIVOTAL ISSUE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

For developing countries, securing greater market access for their
goods and services was the pivotal issue during negotiations. 67 In this
broad context, developing countries sought both the faithful
execution (both in letter and spirit) of commitments made in the
Uruguay Round and increased flexibility in the implementation of
the WTO rules. 6s The critical implementation issues related to
textiles and clothing, anti-dumping, and the Agreement on TradeRelated Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"), but they were
64. See LAL DAS, supra note 53, at I (explaining that because the intense
interest from developed nations, the developing countries were apprehensive about
a new round of negotiations).
65.

See Jeffrey J. Schott, The WTO After Seattle, in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE

15-16 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (listing the numerous issues of the developing
nations that could only be addressed through the Ministerial negotiations).
66. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 48, at xii (advocating that

the next WTO Ministerial should be used to develop negotiations in order to
reduce trade barriers and poverty).
67. See Ganesan, supra note 56, at 85 (stating that the central element to the
developing countries' strategy is now to gain access to market and compete in the
world marketplace).
68. See id. at 87 (arguing that increased flexibility in the application and
definition of rules would help the developing countries create plans that satisfy
their particular needs).
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equally interested in the built-in agenda sectors of agriculture,
services, and intellectual property.69 They wanted a further reduction
of domestic farm supports, elimination of export supports, and
substantial reductions in agriculture tariffs.7" (Though some food
importing developing countries wanted special exemptions on
account of their non-trade concerns). With respect to services,
developing countries advocated for greater movement of natural
persons.7" Under TRIPs, they sought both the correction of
imbalances and substantial reviews of the existing accord. 2 The
developing nations were very apprehensive about the incorporation
of non-trade issues, such as environmental and labor standards,
within the WTO. 7
C. CONTEXT OF MINISTERIAL MEETINGS

The context in which Ministers met was conducive to progress."
This was important because a failure to reach a consensus on a

69. See World Trade Organization, Implementation Issues Central to VTO
Future Work Programme (2002) (stating that for many developing nations,
"capacity restraints have been a major obstacle to the dull implementation of
Uruguay
Round
Agreements"),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min0le/brief_e/brief7_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2002).
70. See World Trade Organization, Agriculture: Current Negotiations.
Implementation and Doha (2002) (noting that the reduction in subsidies, domestic
support, and import barriers are important to reforming global agricultural trade),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_elminist_e/minOl1 _/briefe/
brief04_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
71. See World Trade Organization, Trade jn Services: The Work Programme
and the CurrentNegotiations (2002) (stating that the negotiating countries wanted
to liberalize sections of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, including the
annexes that cover the movement of natural persons who services in another
country), available at http://wwwv.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0 l_e/
brief e/brief06.e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
72. See Like Minded Group, supra note 62, at 26 (stating that the developing
countries believe that the problems and imbalances with private profits and public
policies should be redressed along with certain technology transfer obligations).
73. See Ganesan, supra note 56, at 87 (noting that developing nations are
concerned about the inclusion of environmental and labor issues into the agenda).
74. See Moore Speech, supra note 5, at 3 (remarking that the preparations
made for Doha were different than those completed for the Seattle talks, which
perhaps led to further progress in the negotiations).
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widely acceptable work program would have led many to question
the very value of the institution itself.75 The new negotiations
invoked both strong and negative memories of Seattle. 76 The failure
of the Seattle Ministerial to launch a new round was indeed
unfortunate and without a parallel in the history of the postwar global
trading system.77 One commentator noted that:
Never before had countries come together to start a negotiation and failed
to do so. Prior rounds were replete with instances of missed deadlines and
"time-outs" before talks were completed (for example, the Brussels
ministerial in December 1990, which failed to conclude the Uruguay
Round), but ministers had never before failed to agree to start talking
about trade problems and their possible remedies when they all convened
to do so. Never before had the failure
involved questions about the
78
legitimacy of the trading system itself.

Another debacle would have inflicted great damage to the
multilateral rules-based system and would have condemned it to a
long period of hibernation.79 Specifically, as WTO Director-General,
Mike Moore states:
The current negotiations on agriculture and trade in services would have
run into the sand - destroying hope of bringing an end to the wasteful and
damaging abuse of agricultural export subsidies. The concerns of
developing countries about the implementation of existing agreements,
which have largely dominated the work of the WTO for the past two
years, would have been sidelined. Inequities in the system-and they do
80
exist-would have been set in stone.

75. See id. at 6 (stating that if there had been a failure at Doha, many countries
might have looked elsewhere besides the WTO to address their trade concerns).
76. See id. at 3 (noting that the Seattle negotiations experienced many problems
that the ministers tried to avoid at the Doha meeting).
77. See Schott, supra note 65, at 5 (highlighting that Seattle was the first time
that trade negotiators failed to make any progress or even begin discussions
regarding trade initiatives).
78. Id.
79. See Moore Speech, supra note 5, at 6 (explaining that any failure could
have lead to the creation of regional trade agreements that do not take the
developing countries into consideration).
80. Id.
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IV. DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF
MULTILATERALISM

The Doha Ministerial addressed enormous challenges in the world
trading system. 8' The Doha Declaration begins by acknowledging the
positive contribution of the "multilateral trading" system in fostering
economic growth and development.

2

It articulates the determination

to maintain the process of reform and liberalization of trade policies
and contains a pledge to reject the use of protectionism."
B. AFFIRMATIONS OF INTEREST TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Of special interest to developing countries is the part of the

Declaration that states:
We recognize the need for all our people to benefit from the increased
opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system
generates. The majority of WTO are developing countries. We seek to
place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme
adopted in this Declaration. Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh
Agreement, we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure
that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them,
secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs
of their economic development. In this context, enhanced market access,
balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical
assistance and capacity-building programmes have important roles to
play.

84

81. See infra notes 82-121 and accompanying text (acknowledging the many
controversial areas that the Doha conference attempted to address).
82. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, para. 1 (stating that not only has
the multilateral trading system increased economic growth in the last fifty years, it
will continue to do so in the future).
83. See World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Draft Ministerial
Declaration,WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/l, at para. 1 (Nov. 14, 2001) (announcing the
ideals of the declaration as agreed upon by the participants), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
84. Id. para. 2 (pledging that the declaration seeks to protect the interests of the
developing countries and most importantly the least developed countries around
the world).
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These brave words and noble sentiments are assuringly full of
references to a concrete plank of intended actions. The critical
question is whether this eloquent and comprehensive articulation will
simply adorn the preamble to Doha Declaration (which is essentially
hortatory, non-operative embellishment) or will it see a reasonable
operational fulfillment?
C.

AGENDA SETTING

From the very beginning, developing countries accorded great
importance to the process of agenda setting. 5 They believe that an
agenda, which reflects their interests, is a necessary condition for a
balanced and sufficiently broad-based negotiating outcome.16 It was,
of course, recognized that agenda setting was not the only condition
necessary for a balanced outcome.87 A balanced outcome was
difficult to achieve due to the inherently asymmetrical bargaining
power of the players in global trade arena." Ignoring this
overarching constraint, a balanced outcome would be possible only
through effective participation by developing countries in market
access bargaining and rule making, which in turn requires both a
careful analysis of issues and preparation for negotiations.8 In this
context, capacity restraints seriously handicap a large number of
developing countries."0
85. See Gist of APEC Trade Minister Meeting Statement, KYODO NEWS INT'L,
INC., June 11, 2001, at 1 (noting that the trade ministers of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation met before the negotiations and decided that the agenda
was imperative).
86. See id. (stating that the agenda for the negotiations must be balanced for all
countries and must include issues important to developing nations).
87. See Like Minded Group, supra note 62, at 26 (explaining that even if the
agenda reflected the developing countries issues they would not automatically
participate in negotiations).
88. See Leader: For the Good of the Globe: Justice Is the Goalfor the Doha
Trade Talks for Justice, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 9, 2001, at 19 (arguing that the
unequal bargaining power of the negotiating countries makes the outcome unfair to
developing countries).
89. See Ganesan, supra note 56, at 86 (stating that this balance should spread
through all aspects of the agenda including market access and rule making).
90. See World Bank Statement at WTO Talks in Doha; Strengthening the
hIternationalTrade Architecturefor Development, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 12, 200 1,
at 2 (stating that while many developing countries have been able to gain greater
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D. WORK PROGRAM
The work program itself is spread over three documents, two
declarations-a main declaration 9 l and one on intellectual property
(TRIPs) and public health 92-and one decision on implementation93
The decision is particularly significant because developing nations
often encounter difficulties in implementing the current WTO
agreements. 4
The main ministerial declaration elaborates on the conference's
objectives by providing timetables for the current negotiations in
agriculture and services.95 The declaration also addresses
negotiations or possible negotiations on a range of issues such as
industrial tariffs, investment, competition, environmental regulations,
96
and implementation.
Negotiations under the work program should conclude by January
2005, 91 except for the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which
should conclude by the end of May 2003.98 Other elements of the
market access, many have not because of capacity constraints in trade-related
areas).
91. See MinisterialDeclaration,supra note 2. paras. 12-34 (listing each of the
work programme initiatives).
92. See World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Declarationon the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(O 1)/DEC/2 para. 5 (Nov. 20, 200 1)
[hereinafter Declaration on TRIPs Agreement and Public Health] (declaring the
purpose
for
which
the
declaration
was
made),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist_elminO l_e/mindocl-trips-e.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2002).
93. See World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Implementation
Related Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001) (listing the
different issues relating to the declaration and the decisions that have been made
on
that
issue),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e
/minist e/min0le/mindec implementation-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
94. See id. (announcing that the agreement intends to address the particular
concerns of the developing nations regarding the agreements).
95. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, paras. 13-15 (seeking to "correct
and prevent restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets").
96. See id. paras. 20-25, 31-33 (explaining that the declaration covers trade in
investment, trade and competition, and trade and the environment).
97. See id. para. 45 (stating that the negotiations to be pursued under the terms
of this Declaration shall be concluded by January 1, 2005).
98. See id. para. 30 (proclaiming that negotiations on improvements and
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work program will conclude by the end of 2002 or by the next
Ministerial Conference.99
The declaration on TRIPs and public health recognizes the
flexibility that the agreement gives to governments in order to
address public health problems. l0 It also establishes specific tasks
for the WTO TRIPs Council. 101
E. ANALYSIS OF THE WORK PROGRAM

The Doha Ministerial Declaration is fairly balanced and should be
commended for its positive features.0 2 The agenda reduces tariffs on
industrial goods, phases out farm subsidies, diminishes barriers for
foreign investment, and limits the use of "antidumping" laws. 03
The declaration revitalizes and expands negotiations that seek to
liberalize access to markets. 1°4 The negotiations on agriculture and
services have acquired a much-needed motivation. 05 Significant
gains should be made in both of these sectors. According to estimates
by the World Bank, welfare gains from a fifty percent cut in the
service sector would be five times larger than in the non-services

clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding should conclude by May
2003).
99. See id. para. 12 (declaring that outstanding implementation issues will be
addressed as a matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies, which will report to
the Trade Negotiations Committee, established under paragraph forty-six of the
Declaration).
100. See Moore Speech, supra note 5 (stating that there are important elements
of flexibility in the TRIPs Agreement that can be used to respond to health
emergencies).
101. See Declaration on TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, supra note 92
(dictating the WTO TRIPs Council tasks).
102. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2 (outlining the features of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration).
103. See id. (discussing the various topics on the agenda that were addressed
during the Doha Ministerial Conference).
104. See World Trade Organization, The Doha Declaration Explained (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Explained] (explaining the goal of the Doha Declaration and the
issues that it encompasses), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dda-e/dohaexplainede.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
105. See id. (commenting on the development of the negotiations on agriculture
and services).
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sector. 106 Likewise, the agreement seeks to phase out export subsidies
in agriculture, which is of vital importance to developing countries
and will greatly add to the global welfare.
F. MARKET ACCESS NEGOTIATIONS

The agreement to negotiate market access, covering both tariffs
and non-tariff barriers for industrial products, should prove very
beneficial.10 7 The mandate covers peak tariffs, tariff escalation, and
high tariffs.0 8 According to an estimate, about two-thirds of the
benefits from further reductions in industrial tariffs will go to
developing countries.10 9
G. NEW ISSUES
To the discomfort of developing countries, the negotiating agenda
also covers a range of "new issues" which were among the most
confrontational subjects discussed at Doha."'0 Attendees at Doha
agreed to establish multilateral frameworks for rules on the
competition policy and foreign direct investment, with negotiations
beginning after the Fifth Ministerial Conference.' While developing
106. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 48, at 77 (explaining that
the gains from liberalizing trade in services may have a larger impact than the
gains derived from liberalizing trade in goods).
107. See Press Release, Launching 'Development Round' Could Help Poor
Countries Facing Global Downturn (Oct. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Development
Round Press Release] (stating that removing barriers to trade, which was the topic
of the meetings at Doha, could significantly boost the long-term prospects of
developing
countries),
available
at
http://lnweb I8.worldbank.org/
new/pressrelease.nsf/Press+Release/772CF09B7E66B04B85256AF600590AAE.ht
m (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
108. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, paras. 1-12 (presenting the
mandate of the declaration and the commitment to developing countries and
multilateral trading).
109. See Moore Speech, supra note 5 (providing that tariff reduction is a key
objective for developing countries and therefore concluding that tariff reductions
should benefit them the most).
110. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2 (mapping out the agenda of the
declaration, including the subjects that the developing countries were not happy
about).
111. See id. paras. 20-25 (establishing the position of the negotiators at Doha on
these two issues).
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countries must live with this development, it is not without some

redeeming features." 2 A multilateral framework could bring more
coherence to an area now dependent on a huge number of bilateral
investment treaties, thus moving from a system based mainly on
bilateral arrangements to one organized around a single multilateral
framework. "3
H. POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF THE RANGE OF NEGOTIATIONS

The Declaration also envisages possible negotiations after the
Fifth Ministerial on transparency in the government procurement and
on trade facilitation." 4 The trade facilitation mandate addresses
issues relevant to the movement of goods in international trade and a
successful negotiation would help reduce costs and delays involved
in conducting international business.' The government procurement
issues should not scare developing countries because increased
transparency and better quality in the government procurement
process is in the larger public interest of society."16 It will contribute
to greater probity in governmental business, improve the investment
climate and benefit the supply capacity of developing countries. 7

112. See Doha Explained, supra note 104, para.
implementation concerns associated with the declaration).

12

(clarifying

the

113. See Moore Speech, supra note 5.
114. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, paras. 26-27 (recognizing tie
need for further negotiations to build on the progress made by the Working Group
on Transparency and the Council for Trade in Goods).
115. See id. at 27 (discussing issues relevant to the movement of goods in
international trade).
116. See World Trade Organization, Transparency in Government Procurement.
Applying Fundamental WTO Principle on How Governments Buyl Goods and
Seivices (2002) (asserting that the object of transparency provisions is not only to
ensure that adequate information on procurement opportunities is made available
and that decisions are fairly taken, but also to facilitate monitoring of
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_. . .n99_e/
commitments),
english/about e/17proce.htm (last visited Mar. 20. 2002).
117. See id. (discussing
procurement process).

the

goals of the transparency

in

government

2002]

RECAPTURING MOMENTUM

I.

1121

TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT

The European Union made it a significant priority to address
concerns about the impact of trade on the environment."18 This
discussion would also help the European Union sell the idea of
concessions on agriculture to its citizens. In contrast, many
developing countries perceived this discussion as a pretext for
promoting protectionism. 1 9 Attempts to negotiate on the need for
environmental protection emphasized both the relationship between
existing WTO rules and the trade obligations in Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, and the reduction or elimination of tariff
and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services.' 20 These
discussions, as such, should not pose any serious problems although
the misuse of environmental and labor issues is an uncomfortable
possibility because narrow special interests can undermine the whole
process and protectionism in its new garb can derail liberalization
efforts. As Joseph Stiglitz rightly cautions, "Other protectionists try
to enlist environmental and labor for other types of protection. While
it is imperative that the international community continue to pursue
good environmental policies and2 core labor standards, it should resist
this unholy alliance of interest."'

V. ASSESSMENT OF THE DDA'S ADEQUACY FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. RESERVATIONS ON PART OF SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

After their experience in the Uruguay Round and the Seattle
fiasco, developing countries have been skeptical and even cynical
about the outcome at Doha. 122 Some, in their private evaluations,
118. See Moore Speech, supra note 5 (stating that "'trade and the environment
was one of the most difficult issues at Doha").
119. See id. (addressing the give and take on issues during the negotiations so
that all countries could have their priorities heard).
120. See id. (underscoring that the Committee on Trade and the Environment
will examine the effect of the environment on market access).
121. Stiglitz, supra note 23, at 19.
122. See Moore Speech, supra note 5 (describing how some feel that the Doha
Agreements are a disaster for developing countries but noting that these critics fail

1122

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[17:1097

even regarded Doha to be a failure although this assessment seems
both incorrect and unfair.
B. CRITICISMS OF THE DDA

Although the reaction to the following criticism by Mike Moore is
high pitched, it has a substantial ring of validity about it:
It has been said by some that the Doha Agreements are a disaster for
developing countries. This is a truly spectacular misreading of what
happened there: For some of these critics, there is no conceivable text or
process that would not be represented as a conspiracy against developing
countries and the poor, but no unprejudiced reader of the Doha texts could
fail to appreciate the common theme that runs through almost every
paragraph, which is the fuller integration of developing countries into the
trading system. Provision is made in almost every area for capacity
building to help developed countries participate in and profit from the
work. Special and differential treatment provisions will be reviewed and
strengthened to make them more effective and operational.' 23

C. A FAIR DEAL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE DDA

Developing countries should dispassionately reassess the Doha
outcome. 2 4 They have cause to derive a significant amount of
satisfaction from the Doha Declaration and the work program as it
stands today. 25 They have demonstrated their bargaining clout in the
agenda setting process.' 26 The Doha negotiations could reach a
successful conclusion when the United States and Europe make
significant concessions to the developing world, some of which are
understandably regarded as an anathema to both pharmaceutical and
27
steel companies in the United States and farmers in Europe. 1
to appreciate the common theme that runs through the documents-integration of'
developing countries into the trading system).
123. Id.
124. See infi'a notes 125-127 and accompanying text (highlighting the benefits
of the DDA for developing nations).
125. See Moore Speech, supra note 5 (declaring that there are enough important
initiatives in the Doha package to satisfy all of the disparate parties).
126. See The Doha Agenda, supra note I (highlighting the influence
developing countries in the negotiations and agenda setting process).

of

127. See Development Round Press Release, supra note 107 (reporting that to
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Of course, an agreement on an agenda is just the beginning of the
process. The arduous portion of the journey lies ahead. The agreed
agenda "essentially becomes a game plan for negotiations by the 142
nations-and can foretell the ultimate outcome."'' 2 It will take
several years of hard bargaining before a positive outcome is
achieved and this is the challenge to which developing countries
have to make an adequate response.' 2 9
D. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

As to the critical issues of implementation, the separate decisions
on issues raised by the developing countries about the
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements signifies that a
large number of these problems are already resolved. 3 " About fifty
of these problems have been transformed from unilateral requests
into multilateral commitments to negotiate, which further
underscores the possibility of substantial progress. 31

VI. STRATEGY FOR EFFECTIVENESS
A. EFFORTS ON A WIDE SPECTRUM

In order to ensure a positive outcome in the DDA negotiations,
developing countries must make serious efforts to change their
mindset by improving their knowledge of the issues, upgrading their
skills, and affecting fundamental domestic reforms.'32 Although it
may be regarded as presumptuous to give any advice to seasoned
remove barriers to trade, developed countries must be willing to place agriculture
and textiles on the negotiating table).
128. Cooper & Winestock, supra note 1, at Al (stating that the admission of
China and Chinese Taipei has already increased the organization's membership

from one hundred forty-two to one hundred forty-four).
129. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, para. 45 (deeming 2005 as the
date for completing most negotiations).
130. See Doha Explained, supra note 104 (citing the obligations of developing

countries with respect to agenda items).
131. See id. (stating that negotiations on outstanding implementation and trade
issues will become an integral part of the work program).
132. See Cooper & Winestock, supra note 1 (discussing the challenges that
developing countries face).
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practitioners, perhaps some suggestions from one who is now away
from the battleground and consequently with a different perspective,

may be useful.'33
B. SOME SUGGESTIONS
1. Mindset, Attitudes, and Perspectives

Developing nations must change their mindset, attitudes, and
perspectives. Doha was not a setback. In reality, it was a significant
step forward for both the developed and developing worlds. "4 Of
course, it does not represent a dramatic breakthrough (nor was it
expected to be so), but it is both a reasonable and pragmatic
compromise.'35 In examining Doha, one should think of a glass halffull rather than the contrary image of a glass half-empty.'36
Nations should learn lessons from past experiences without
lamenting upon them. Justice is a rare commodity in the world and
one may never get what one deserves.' 37 Dwelling upon injustices of
133. See infra notes 134-154 and accompanying text (detailing certain
suggestions for developing nations).
134. See Michael M. Weinstein, A Better Chancefor Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2001, at A 19 (reporting that the agreement reached in Doha is good for
rich countries and perhaps even better for poor countries).
135. See Moore Speech, supra note 5 (recognizing the willingness of all
Ministers to make concessions in order to achieve consensus, thereby allowing a
compromise to be reached).
136. Developing nations believe that they have achieved a significant amount of
progress at Doha. See Declarationon TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, supra
note 92 (striking a balance between countries' right to act to protect Public Hlealth
and the need to avoid undermining the TRIPs Agreement); see also Ministerial
Declaration, supra note 2 (committing to negotiate on antidumping regulations and
subsidies/countervailing rules that should be welcomed by developing countries).
Again, an understanding on dispute settlements for improvements and
clarifications is a positive development. See generally Schneider, supra note 39, at
702. Similarly, the use of a Working Group to examine the relationship between
trade, debt, and finance as well as between trade and the transfer of technology can
only benefit developing countries. See generally Ministerial Declaration, supra
note 2.
137. See WAYNE W. DYER, YOUR EROGENOUS ZONES 173 (1965) (commenting

that justice is simply a concept that has almost no applicability, particularly as it
pertains to your own choice). The legal system promises justice, but it generally
does not occur unless people work to foster it. Id.
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the past and indulging in self-pity will immobilize both developed
and developing nations in the present and the future. 131
In order to succeed in a multilateral regime, developing nations
must improve their knowledge of the rules of the game. Developing
nations should constantly strive to expand their understanding of the
global trading architecture and learn to appreciate its strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and constraints. Such nations can
formulate effective strategies only if they are aware of both the
external environment and the dynamics of the institution."3 9
Developing nations should work to adopt a holistic approach to
solving their problems. The framework of the WTO cannot
adequately address all of the problems bearing on a development
agenda in the sphere of trade. 40 It is necessary to go beyond the
WTO, by building alliances and securing aid for trade.'
It is
worthwhile to establish a link in the minds of the industrial world,
between improving the global trade architecture and reducing
poverty in developing countries. 42
2. New Par'adigm
Developing nations should work to foster a new paradigm within
their trade relationships. 43 The dynamics and logic of globalization
are transforming relationships between countries. " These
138. See id. at 165 (stating that self-defeating behavior results in immobilization,
which in turn promotes a no-justice-reality).
139. See id. at 167 (discussing strategies to overcome the realities of injustice).
140. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 48, at xii (discussing the
report of four policy domains and contending that providing market access may not
by itself be enough to elicit new trade from developing countries).
141. See id. at xiii (suggesting that increasing multilateral "aid for trade"
development assistance to promote trade infrastructure could help developing
nations).
142. See id. (highlighting that reshaping global trade architecture for
development would reduce world poverty).
143. See infia notes 144-147 and accompanying text (detailing how recent
events have changed certain relationships between the developed and developing
worlds).
144. See Schott, supra note 65, at 71 (discussing the new paradigm shift in trade
relationships). The developing countries need to reassess their priorities in view of
a paradigm shift in trade relationships. For example, in the past, trade negotiations
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transformed relationships have become more pronounced since the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. "1The attacks have made the
world more conscious of its indivisibility, security, and prosperity. 4 ,
There are no longer any separate categories of "industrial" and
"developing"' countries and, in the future, more alliances that are
subject specific will transcend the divide between developing and
47
industrial countries.1
Developing nations should also seek to improve their knowledge
about the multilateral trading system. By improving knowledge, they
can diminish the fear of the unknown with respect to new issues and
find opportunities to bargain with the developed countries for a better
deal. On other issues, they must learn to engage positively in order to
appreciate the concerns of industrial countries. 48 With respect to
investment, transparency, and trade facilitation, there is a possibility
placed significant emphasis on the issues of specialized and differential treatment.
See Watal, supra note 44, at 73. Although the Doha Declaration has reaffirmed this
principle, it has not yet achieved any concrete or tangible results. Instead of
spending their energy on this issue, developing nations should think proactively in
identifying their own interests and make appropriate bargains as equal partners in
the system. Developing countries should concentrate on demanding improved
market access to counterbalance proposals made by the industrial countries to
expand the WTO agenda. In fact, developing nations have sought modifications in
a wide range of existing agreements to take into account their trade interests or
special problems, including the 'operationalizing" of special and differential trade
provisions." Id.
145. See WTO Doha, Closing Press Conference Fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference, Nov. 14, 2001 (stating that September eleventh served to focus all our
minds on the need to send a strong political signal of confidence in the multilateral
international system and the need to inject optimism into a gloomy economic
landscape), available at http://www.wtodoha.org/news/article2l.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2002).
146. Id.
147. See Michael White, Isolationism Not An Option for the West, Says Blair,
THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 13, 2001 (stating that September eleventh served to focus all
of our minds on the need to send a strong political signal of confidence in the
multilateral international system and the need to inject optimism into a gloomy
economic
landscape),
available
at
http://www.guardian ....
ponse/
story/0,11017,59249,00.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
148. See generally World Trade Organization. Ten Misunderstandings About
the WTO, Small Countries are Not Powerless in the WTO (discussing the
influence of small countries when they engage in the WTO), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/1Omis_e/lOmO7e.htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2002).
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of clear trade offs between issues that are of interest to developing
countries such as agriculture, anti-dumping regulations, and peak
industrial tariffs.
The WTO and industrial countries should be persuaded to convert
"best endeavor" promises to binding commitments, whereby they
will provide low-income countries with financial and technical
assistance to implement WTO accords and build capacity. To
achieve this goal, developing nations should improve their
negotiating skills.
In order to derive optimum benefits from gains in the WTO
framework, developing nations should adopt specific domestic
reforms. 4 9 They should first adopt a program of trade reform,
including the phased lowering of border protection for goods and
services as part of a poverty reduction strategy.' As part of any
trade reform program, developing countries should also adopt
companion policies to both cushion any adverse impact on the poor
and ensure investment responses by soliciting foreign assistance
when necessary to implement administrative requirements of
programs.
Developing nations should also spur the development of industries
essential to trade and business services, particularly through the
introduction of favorable regulatory incentives. They can also
encourage domestic intellectual property development through
TRIPs-consistent standards appropriate to their needs.'' Finally,
developing nations can ensure an adequate macroeconomic policy
52
framework to provide a sound investment climate.
149. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 48, at xii (stating that in
order for trade talks to succeed, the global community will need to ensure that the
world's poorest countries and poorest people will derive some benefit).

150. See id. (explaining that the reduction of restrictions on products and
services produced by poor countries is needed).
151. See Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, art.66, para. 1, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. (1994) (defining TRIPS standards).

152. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR TIlE WORLD'S POOR xviii
(2002) (establishing a four part policy agenda that seeks to promote world trade in
a manner that will benefit low income nations). It recommends: 1) convening a
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CONCLUSION
The Doha Development Agenda clearly acknowledges the
need to put developing countries' concerns at the core of any
multilateral trading system. The Ministerial Declaration Decisions on
Implementing Related Issues and the TRIPs Agreement reflect a

movement to remove imbalances from the system and make it
multilateral in the true sense of the word. The DDA is full of rich

possibilities and can become a potent force for liberalizing trade,
stimulating growth, both in industrial and developing countries,
while simultaneously reducing poverty throughout the world.'5 3 If the

Round does not succeed, however, there are going to be both
repercussions and a lasting negative impact. As Joseph Stiglitz
appositely notes:
If negotiations follow historical patterns-hard bargaining motivated by
special interests within developed countries, with too little attention paid
to the interests of the developing countries--they could strengthen the
hand of those in the developing world who resist market reforms and an
outward orientation. It could give confirmation and ammunition to those
who see relations between the Third World and the developed countries
through the prism of conflict and exploitation, rather than recognizing the
potential for cooperation and mutual gain. Outward-oriented policies will
development round in the WTO to include market access in areas of agriculture,
manufacturing and services and improving WTO transparency, participation,
implementation procedures and phasing; 2) global cooperation to support trade
outside the WTO; provide "aid for trade" through stepped up development
assistance, expand "Integrated Framework" assistance to all low-income countries,
and expand multilateral assistance to overcome country-specific bottlenecks to
improving competitiveness and trading potential and to promote trade; 3) policies
for high-income countries to promote market access, grant to low-income countries
duty-free and quota-free access to markets of all countries of OECD, reduce
uncertainty of market access by harmonizing rules of origin, and by reducing
threats of antidumping and adopt domestic policies that facilitate adjustment of
labor to economic change; and 4) Policies for developing countries as explained in
the text. Id. According to estimates of the World Bank, following the above fourpart policy agenda can yield very high benefits and help in reducing poverty. id.
Developing countries can reap income gains in 2015 attributed to trade
liberalization of S500 (in 1997 dollars) if measured in dynamic terms or $355
billion if measured in static terms (static results assumes that productivity be
constant while dynamic gains allow productivity to respond to sector-specific
export to output ratios). Id.
153. See Moore Speech, supra note 5 (expressing that Doha will be remembered
as a turning point in the history of the WTO and the world trading system).
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succeed only to the extent that there are markets in which developing
countries can sell their products, as well as international rules that allow
developing countries to make good use of their areas of comparative
advantage. 154

Thus, the DDA presents historic challenges and opportunities for
the multilateral trading system.

154. See Stiglitz, supra note 23, at 23 (emphasizing the importance, especially
for developing countries, of fairness in the rules governing future trade talks).
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